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Abstract 
The current decade has been remarkably challenging for the whole European Union. The 
outburst of the migration crisis and the increase of nationalism in the Central-Europe has put 
the future of the European Union under concern. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the 
change of positions and statements of the Visegrad countries toward the European 
integration, based on the challenges and critical questions that EU is facing. The empirical 
part is constructed through critical discourse analysis, bases on the theory of constructivism 
and uses supranational governance and intergovernmental approach as competing ideas of 
European integration. The materials used for the analyse are the official statements and 
annual reports of the Visegrad Group. 
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Introduction 
In 2000 the European Union (EU) adopted a moto “United in Diversity” that 
symbolises how Europeans have formed a union to work together for peace and 
prosperity, while simultaneously being enriched by numerous distinctive cultures, 
traditions and language (EU 2017a). The member states have accepted the founding 
principles of the European Union and by signing the treaties, each of them have an 
obligation to contribute achieving the common goals of the union. However, the 
negative developments across the world are constantly challenging the unity of the 
region.  
 
The European Union has been facing many difficult issues in the recent decade. The 
global financial crisis in 2008 had a highly negative consequence on EU markets 
followed by Greek debt crisis in 2009, the beginning of largest migration crisis since 
the Second World War in 2015 and Britain’ decision to leave the EU in 2016 are only 
a few examples of recent happenings. In addition, Europe is witnessing a rise of 
nationalism in many member states of the EU for example France, Germany, Hungary 
and Poland. These factors have impacted the integration process between the member 
states. There is a lot of information circulating in the media that states the connection 
between emerging crises and rising nationalism. Furthermore, in critical situations 
where credible decisions are necessary, not all member states favour the power of the 
EU over national governments and accept the idea of sharing sovereignty. This can 
cause contradictions that can develop into tensions and arguments between the 
supporters of different views and have a negative effect to the unity by restraining the 
further integration and threatening the peace of the region. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the change of positions and statements of the 
Visegrad countries toward the European integration, based on the challenges and 
critical questions that EU is facing. The Visegrad Group (V4) consists of four Central-
European countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. All of the states 
are also part of the European Union. The reason behind choosing these countries is the 
fact that Visegrad Group countries have voiced a lot of objection to the recent 
decisions of the EU and many political developments in these countries, the 
strengthening of the far right political elite in particular, highlights the importance this 
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issue even more. In this thesis the analysis is based on one critical issue: the migration 
crisis. 
 
It has been almost three years since the beginning of the biggest migration crisis in the 
recent past. The number of refugees and migrants who have arrived to the EU is over 
1 million, most of them from Syrian war but also from other conflictual countries. The 
European Union has agreed on several methods to find solutions. The main steps 
included are attempts to resolve the root causes and increasing humanitarian aid inside 
as well as outside of the EU borders. Furthermore, refugees are being relocated within 
the EU, resettled from neighbour states and people who do not need protection are 
returned to their home countries. Last but not least, the European Union is focusing 
more on the protection of external border by improving security and coast guard. In 
March 2016 the EU signed an agreement with Turkey. According to that, the asylum 
seekers departing from Turkey to Greek islands can be sent back to Turkey. “For 
every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek island after an irregular crossing, the 
EU will take in a Syrian from Turkey who has not sought to make this journey in an 
irregular way” (European Union 2016).  
 
The recent events in Visegrad countries confirm the shift towards nationalism. In 
Poland far-right Law and Justice Party became unexpectedly successful in May 2015 
and the presidential elections was won by Andrzej Duda who was supported from the 
same party. The main views of his campaign included reduction of EUs’ influence and 
focusing on the national sovereignty and interests. In the Czech Republic the far-right 
parties began to gather popularity only since 2015 and further there has been a rise of 
far-right attitudes along with racism and xenophobia. The Prime minister 
controversially emphasised the need to help refugees but at the same time rejects the 
mandatory quotas. Very critical opinions of refugees and the EU approach on the 
issue have come also from the president and Tomio Okamura with strong anti-
immigrant views. In Hungary the anti-European views and far-right parties reach back 
to previous decade and are still visible in the slowly raising popularity of nationalistic 
Jobbik party with its leader Gábor Vona who, although pro-Islam, is strongly against 
immigration. The same views are supported by ruling Fidesz party among its leader 
Viktor Orbán. In Slovakia, there was an unexpected success of Neo-Nazis in the 2016 
elections, whose leader Marián Kotleba is also strongly objecting migration and the 
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EU as a whole (Kolár 2016). According to the standard Eurobarometer Survey 
conducted in May 2016, 67% of Czechs, the same percentage of Hungarians, 51% of 
Poles and 59% Slovaks mention immigration as the top concern at European level but 
not in national level. The survey also revealed that only approximately third of 
Europeans (33%) trust the EU (Eurobarometer 2016: 7, 14). 
 
As proved above, the refugee crisis and the rise of far-right parties among Visegrad 
counties is a very visible issue that can be connected. The main research question of 
this thesis is to find out whether and how the understanding of European integration 
changes among the Visegrad Group when facing with refugee crisis. To find out how 
it is manifested, I have proposed a hypothesis, which can be found on chapter 1.4. 
 
Thesis consists of three parts. The first section is theoretical and focuses on the views 
of social constructivism that emphasises the importance of ideas and highlights that 
identity is socially constructed. The second section of theory emphasises on 
approaches of intergovernmentalism and supranational governance as the competing 
ideas of European integration. The construction of hypothesis is also included in the 
theoretical part. The second part of the theory focuses on methodology and includes 
the theoretic framework of critical discourse analysis and empirical materials. The 
materials used are the annual reports and joint statements of the Visegrad Group and 
reflect the views of the group towards the EU. The third part of the thesis is analysis 
that consists of three sections. The first analyses the occurred EU policies and 
Visegrads’ views based on these policy areas which emerged before the refugee crisis 
and highlight the approaches that support the supranational governance or 
intergovernmentalism. The second part of the analyses focuses on the period from the 
start of the refugee crisis until 2016. The idea here is same as in last part: to highlight 
the statements supporting supranationalism or intergovernmentalism within the 
emerging EU-level policies. The analysis ends with the comparison of two periods in 
order to highlight the results and conclude whether the conducted hypothesis was 
confirmed.   
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1. Theoretical approaches 
 
1.1. Constructivism in European Studies 
Constructivism, also known as social constructivism, is based on the idea that 
constant interconnection between social agents forms and recreates social reality. The 
material world is not something categorized. As a result, the objects of our 
understanding are unable to appear separately from interpretation and language 
(Saurugger 2014: 146). Human agents only exist together with their social 
environment and its system of meanings that is shared collectively (Risse 2004: 160). 
“Constructivism links the production and reproduction of social practices and 
emphasizes their location in specific contexts” (Saurugger 2014: 146). In explaining 
the constructivist views, this thesis is mainly focused on the approaches of Thomas 
Risse, Alexander Wendt, Ben Rosamond and Sabine Saurugger. 
 
Constructivism as a social theory was adapted to international relations in the 1980s 
and constructivist approaches appeared in European integration context at the end of 
the 1990s to a great extent as a favour of Nicolas Onuf and Alexander Wendt who 
used constructivism frameworks to explain social phenomena (Saurugger 2014: 145). 
Unlike rationalists, constructivists find accurate that in the world of politics structural 
features, such as anarchy, are not permanent and independent from the interaction of 
states. Anarchy is rather constructed socially, understood inter-subjectively, and 
reproduced through the interaction of states. Thus, “state behaviour does not just 
derive from anarchic international environment; it also helps to making it” 
(Rosamond 2000: 172). According to Wendt, “anarchy is what state makes it” (Wendt 
1992). Constructivism has a wide range of definitions, but in brief, it is possible to 
state that constructivists in international relations support the approach according to 
which the structures of world politics are created through social interactions, that 
countries are active and powerful actors instead of static subjects, their identities 
cannot be seen as homogenous, but “(re)constituted through complex, historical 
overlapping (often contradictory) practices and therefore variable, unstable, constantly 
changing” (Knutsen 1997). There is a fine line between domestic politics and 
international relations and, therefore, it is hard to distinguish them (ibid). In modern 
world, the approaches of international relations are often dominated by the materialist 
ontology. Neorealists, as well as a large part of neoliberalists, often emphasise the 
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importance of material aspects, like power and interests, but do not see the 
considerable role of ideas. Only a small part of international life functions only based 
on material forces, because ideas and culture are as important in shaping it. (Wendt 
1999: 371). The raised attention on less rational elements makes constructivism a 
suitable theoretical approach in this thesis. 
 
Two crucial factors in the context of constructivism in international relations, and in 
European studies as well, are norms and interests. Norms co-create actor performance, 
not only through formulating or shaping certain behaviour, but also enabling it. When 
international norms are socialized and revealed in the frames of the community, the 
internalization of these norms, values, and rules by those within is resulted. 
Constructivist categorise norms into two types. The first ones are regulatory norms, 
which fix how a state should and should not behave. The second set are constitutive 
norms which form state functions, identities and interests while not being legal tools 
by definition. However, international law might formalize those. Both norms, 
constructed by social interaction, are stable and flexible within the social interaction 
that formulated these and, at the same time, they have a constituent impact on how 
individuals and organizations behave (Saurugger 2014: 150). The definition of 
interests is also complex: constructivist do not believe that state interests are a sum of 
individual interests of national actors or interest groups, also that it is the interests of 
an elite (Saurugger 2014: 151). Member states commitment to European integration 
can be understood as a regulative value based norm, while the wish to preserve 
national sovereignty expresses the interest of a country and belongs to the set of 
constitutive norms. 
 
Based on the work of Christiansen, Joergensen and Wiener (1999), as well as Checkel 
(2007), Sabine Saurugger emphasises on thus three predominant inputs of empirical 
research in the area that has invested into the European integration theory. First, 
accepting the concept of simultaneous creation of agency and structures has 
contributed to further explanations among Europeanization and transformation of 
European countries. Second, which is connected to the first, stressing on the co-
constitutive elements of judicial European law, rules and policies provides a chance to 
learn how European integration shapes social identities and interests of actors. Third, 
by focusing at different forms of communication, researches are able to conduct more 
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detailed analyses on the discursive approaches of the EU as well as how the actors 
understand the ideas of European integration. These approaches of European 
integration contribute to the idea of the EU being a process and not only the final 
outcome. The research of European integration focuses on defining the reasons for 
longstanding changes in social, political and economic affairs (Saurugger 2014: 151-
152). 
 
Therefore, the main conceptual approaches to the integration in the European studies 
are: socialization and learning, the social construction of European identity, and actor-
centred constructivism. The first approach sees European integration as socialization 
and learning process that creates a shift in the preferences of actors (Saurugger 2014: 
151-152). Saurugger, using Antje Wiener’s idea (2006; 2008), has implemented that 
the European integration in constructivist analysis is connected by two things: social 
construction of institutions and the successful implementation of rules, norms and 
legal principles. This has led to a widely accepted “understanding of how the 
establishment of norms at the EU level leads to a higher level of norm compliance at 
the national level” (Saurugger 2014: 153). The benefit of learning is the power to 
acknowledge various layers where reality is created and, thus, learning lets 
researchers integrate into European integration one of the biggest challenges in the 
study. “Reality is constructed by the individual, the group to which it belongs, the 
media or, more generally, by the messages transmitted on several levels: locally, 
regionally, nationally, Europe-wide or more internationally” (Saurugger 2014: 154).  
 
The second approach, social construction of European identity connects more with 
this thesis and, therefore, will be explained in next sub-chapter. The third perspective, 
actor-centred constructivism, assumes that the way actors behave is influenced by 
beliefs and views created by certain power constellations. The main question here is: 
“to what extent exactly ideas shape policy outcomes?” (Saurugger 2014: 156). Even 
in international sphere, where political leaders encounter with difficult issues, they do 
not immediately know the right or perfect answer for solving the situation. In order to 
find solutions, problems need to be clarified first. In this context, it is visible how 
ideas affect the actors: Problems must be interpreted in order to be solved. Here we 
can see how ideas influence actors: contrasting ideas create different understandings 
of issues and different construction of solutions (Saurugger 2014: 156-157). 
11 
 
1.2 Social construction of a European identity 
An important key is that “constructivism is not a substantive theory of integration, but 
rather ontological perspective on meta theory” (Risse 2004: 174). The constructivist 
approach of European identity, as socially constructed, arouse from the ambition to 
find out whether it is possible to detect a common European identity within the EU, 
and if so, how it has been established. In the constructivist analysis, the first 
presumption is similar to neofunctionalism: the result of the European integration 
process causes the formation of transnational identity. In the analysis, the 
constructivist set an assumption that in order to recognize the visibility and legitimacy 
of the European political system, identification with the EU to some extent is 
required. Nevertheless, the idea is not to assume that it is possible to be only 
European or feel a sense of belonging just with the nation state, but to prove the 
existence of multi-level identity (Saurugger 2014: 154-155). People can identify 
themselves with the EU and their home country, but also based on their gender or 
other sub-groups of the society. Thomas Risse defines both Europe and nation as 
imagined communities and emphasises people do not have to select only one identity, 
but can have both. The most separating situation raises between those, who feel a 
sense of belonging only with their nation and those, who see and feel themselves 
being part of both nation state and Europe. In order to support the idea of policy-
making on the European level, it is unnecessary to have people or communities who 
are willing to replace national identity with the European one. The only precondition 
is the combination of two-level identities that complete each other (Risse 2004: 167). 
“European identity is not a fact, but rather a construction in a specific time and place, 
the context of which changes according to the political and social context in which it 
is embedded” (Risse 2004: 171) This approach explains the idea of Euroscepticism in 
constructivist studies, because identity building is not smooth, but controversial. One 
of the possible outcomes is the raise of opposition to some policies and also to 
integration of Europe (Risse 2010).  
 
The stronger the member states of the EU identify themselves as part of the European 
Union, the more they feel connected with the European community and, therefore, are 
more willing to adapt the decision made in the EU level. However, since identities are 
socially constructed and when the political and social context changes, the identities 
can change as well. According to Thomas Risse, it is not definite that the European 
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identity coexisting with the national one is sufficient to further European integration 
in the long run, especially from the social perspective. Although, the identities may 
not be influenced by everyday policymaking in the EU, they do matter in bigger 
decisions that determine the course of the union (Risse 2010: 182, 203). Moreover, 
changing identities through persuasion and without crises or critical junctures is 
almost impossible (Risse 2010: 100). In the context of this thesis it is possible that the 
refugee crisis has influenced the construction of social identities which has led to the 
weakening of European identities among Visegrad group. Their attitudes toward 
European integration might also change: as a result of refugee crisis, it is seen as a 
threat to nation-state sovereignty.  
 
1.3 Competing ideas of European Integration 
In constructivists studies, ideas always matter, but in order to do that, they have to be 
shared by wide range of people or other groups, such as organisations, policymakers, 
social groups or society. Ideas include a strong social component, but simultaneously 
they are mental constructs of individuals, “sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and 
attitudes” which determine the general orientations for behaviour and policy 
(Tannenwald 2005: 15). According to Wendt, ideas are not more important nor 
autonomous from power and interests. In opposite, power and interests consist of 
ideas and influence their formation. For power and interest explanations, ideas are 
presumed and, to that extent, do not compete with ideational explanations at all. “The 
meaning of the distribution of power in international relation is constituted in 
important part by the distribution of interests, and that the content of interests is in 
turn constituted in important part by ideas” (Wendt 1999: 135-136). The main 
perception of this thesis is to focus on two common European integration approaches 
– intergovernmental and supranational. Instead of using these as classical theories, I 
will adopt them as two competing ideas of European integration. Similarly to other 
theories, many different approaches of these ideas exist. Here, only a few of these will 
be explained to distinguish the main principles of both approaches.  
 
Intergovernmentalism, like many other theoretical approaches of European 
Integration, is state-centric and aims to determine whether the sovereignty in Europe 
can still be seen on national level or it is being shifted to the European level 
(Bickerton 2012: 22). The intergovernmental approach presents integration as “series 
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of bargains” or, as some others have stated, it refers to co-operation between the 
sovereign member states of the union at any chosen level based on their common 
interests. This cooperation is also known as pooled sovereignty and does not threaten 
the sovereignty of the countries in any significant way, because the states have the full 
control over the degree and nature of actions. It helps the states to adapt the 
restrictions that international environment is causing and by this, strengthens them 
(Saurugger 2014: 55, Bickerton 2012: 22). In liberal intergovernmentalist views, 
institutions are seen as mechanisms to make sure that commitments made for member 
governments are credible, that is a way of assuring other governments, with whom 
deals are made, will stick to their side of the bargain (CIVITAS 2016). The study of 
economically rational actors revealed that the main focuses of liberal 
intergovernmentalism are political and social interactions in economic integration. 
Overall, the theory looks for explaining dynamics of European integration and 
understanding why sovereign states have agreed to transfer certain decision-making to 
supranational institutions, which continuously increased their powers to the level of 
controlling internal economic policy of the country (Saurugger 2014: 67). “Tensions 
between members on issues of Eurozone governance, or on defence matters, are taken 
as a proof that the EU remains a fissile coalition of self-interested governments 
(Bickerton 2012: 23)”.  
 
Supranational governance has its roots in neo-functionalism and is a less state-centric 
alternative to liberal intergovernmentalism (Saurugger 2014). Neo-functionalist 
approaches stress the many possible ways of spill-over whereby “the cumulative 
weight on individual decision biases outcomes in favour of greater supranationalism” 
(Bickerton 2012: 22-23). The supranational idea refers to sharing the sovereignty of a 
state, meaning that in certain policy areas, member states of the union have decided to 
delegate their decision-making rights to the institutional body that stands above the 
nation state. In this case countries agree to accept the majority decisions and with this 
may suffer from some loss of national sovereignty (Nugent 2003: 502–503). To a 
large extent, this definition can be used to describe the nature of the EU- states agree 
on certain policy areas where the decision-making is delegated to the institutions of 
the European Union. Bodies that are called supranational must satisfy set criteria: to a 
certain degree, they are independent from the states that created them; their orders and 
reached resolutions are legally binding on the member states as well as on natural and 
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legal persons; their measures are superior over national ones and they differ from 
other international organizations by the extent of their power (Majone 2005: 43). 
 
The main theorist of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik did not see 
strong supranational institutions as direct opposite of intergovernmentalism. He 
believed that by joining all, except the most minimalists of regimes, means losing 
national autonomy to some extent in exchange for certain advantages. That decision 
increases the political risk to all the member states: “In the intergovernmentalist view, 
the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only 
insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens their control over domestic affairs, 
permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable” (Moravcsik 1993: 507) After 
the establishment of the European Union, one can argue, the member states behaviour 
have shifted more towards the supranational approach along with the EU itself and the 
concept of shared sovereignty is more and more acceptable with the deepening of 
integration. According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz theory of supranational 
governance, intergovernmental politics is considered as the perfect type of 
international bargaining between these states where the EU works as a very strict 
international regime. The supranational governance is the end of the 
intergovernmental continuum and represents centralized control of governance power 
over policy areas across the involved member-states (Rosamond 2000: 127). It is clear 
that in the reality there is a certain balance between these two fundamentally different 
approaches that can be referred as two-level games. Based on the approach of Robert 
Putnam, this means that states are acting simultaneously in two levels. At the national 
level the power-holders are trying to increase the support of domestic groups while at 
the international level “the same actors seem to bargain in a ways that enhance their 
position domestically by meeting the demands of key domestic constituents” 
(Rosamond 2000: 136). In the EU many member states are strongly interested in 
domestic benefit of the union-level decisions but in some cases they are willing or 
should be willing to accept with less self-profit and focus on the larger context.  
 
In the EU characteristics, both approaches can be seen. In defence of 
intergovernmentalism, it can be implied that the decisions of most public policy areas 
are still mainly taken at the national level; European Council rarely uses majority 
voting for decision making, instead, all important decisions need the approval of 
15 
 
minister in the Council of ministers; the Commission and the European Parliament, 
seen as two most supranational institutions, are restricted in their powers to make 
decisions. On the supranational side, the arguments are that the Commission is very 
important legislator in the secondary and regulatory decision-making; norm changing 
and treaty reforms have increased the policy spheres where qualified majority voting 
is now common; the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam has considerably 
broadened the influence of the European Parliament over EU decision-making and the 
decision that have binding force constitute the EU law which in some cases takes 
precedence over national law (Nugent 2003: 504–505) It can be concluded, that 
European Union is a mix of supranational and intergovernmental approach. 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The recent challenges the EU is currently facing have raised concerns that there is a 
connection between the crises and remarkable rise of nationalism. In terms of critical 
times that demand credible decisions, the EU’s supranational approach and shared 
sovereignty is not necessarily accepted by all of the member states. Furthermore, in 
these critical times dissatisfied member states seem more likely to favour national 
sovereignty over the integration. In this thesis, the theory of member states favouring 
national sovereignty over integration in crisis is tested with Visegrad Group countries. 
 
The Visegrad Group was formed in 1991 and consists of Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia. All of these countries became the members of the EU in 2004, 
but the V4 continued to exist inside the union. The purpose of this group has overall 
been the same since the establishment: Central-European cooperation to reach set 
goals and common interests. The Visegrad Group favours the European integration 
efforts and aims cooperation with all the countries in order to ensure the democratic 
development in all parts of Europe (International Visegrad Fund 2017). Recently, the 
V4 has taken a seemingly different approach to the policies of the EU. An article, 
published in The Economist on January 28th in 2016, states the Visegrad Group has 
made a turn from accelerating integration towards illiberalism by taking extremely 
strong anti-migrant views. The loudest of voices has been Viktor Orban, the prime 
minister of Hungary and after the elections in Poland were won by far-right 
nationalist conservative Law and Justice party, the negative attitudes towards refugees 
took over in there as well. Slovakia and Czech Republic have been more modest, but 
16 
 
also disagree with the EU’s migration policy (The Economist Newspaper Limited: 
2016). 
 
As illustrated above, the V4 has shown a lot of dissatisfaction with the recent 
decisions of the EU and recent political development in these countries and 
strengthening of the far right political elite in particular seem to compose a real threat 
to the European Integration. Therefore, to test the theory, the set hypothesis is: 
 
Keeping all the other factors constant, when critical issues are at stake at the 
European level, countries of the Visegrad Group are more likely to favour 
national sovereignty over the integration. 
 
Through conduction of discourse analysis, the goal of this thesis is to find a change in 
the attitudes of V4 in terms of the crisis where critical issues are at stake. Critical 
issues are defined here as nationally sensitive problems and decision that go against 
national interests. It is expected that before the crisis, the countries are fully or mainly 
supporting the European Integration as the supranational idea of integration. However, 
when a crisis appears, the balance changes and now the Visegrad Group are expected 
to favour more national sovereignty, as the intergovernmental idea of integration, over 
the European integration. This would show that, when some decisions go against the 
national interests of the V4, they prefer the intergovernmental approach. The result of 
the conducted analysis will confirm of disconfirm the set hypothesis. 
 
It is presumed that before the crisis, the countries are acting according to the 
regulatory norms and do what they should do, thus supporting the supranational 
approach while after the crisis they still turn to constitutive norms such as interests 
and thus their interests favour more the intergovernmental idea. 
 
This hypothesis also contains certain limitations. First, the refugee crisis is the critical 
issue focused on in the thesis. Although other recent critical happenings may have, to 
a small degree, contributed to the change of attitudes towards the integration, the 
current research focuses only on the change occurred with the refugee crisis. Second, 
the change is analysed only as a shift in attitudes among the whole V4 and, hence, it is 
not possible to distinguish the changes between these four countries. Third, the 
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findings of these thesis do not mean that the same result will be found when testing 
the existing theory with other member states or unions of member states within the 
EU regardless of the political developments in these countries. 
 
It is important to take into consideration that migration topic has been discussed in the 
EU level before the current crisis. The asylum policy was supranationalized to a large 
extent already with the Lisbon Treaty. According to Thomas Risse, the amount of 
asylum seekers at that time did not contribute into supranationalisation of the policy, 
rather it is a spill-over from other policy areas (Risse 2010: 220). 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Critical discourse analysis 
In order to find whether there is a connection between socially constructed European 
identity and change of ideas towards the integration among Visegrad countries and 
how this is expressed, critical discourse analysis (CDA) by Norman Fairclough is 
used. The approach of Fairclough is a suitable method, because it focuses on the 
concept of social practice. Here, it is understood as “relatively stabilised form of 
social activity” (Fairclough 2003: 205). Each of such practices is a reflection of 
multiple components in a composition that generally contains discourse as well. 
Therefore, CDA is a method for analysing dialectical connection between discourse 
and other aspects of social practices. It is specially interested in fundamental changes 
happening in modern social life. Since the aim of this thesis is to find how the 
discourse effects the changes in the society, this method is appropriate. 
 
In social practices, discourse appears in three main ways. First, it is a part of broader 
practice. In addition, discourse emerges in representations – a process of social 
construction of practices. Social actors of any practice produce representations of 
others and at the same time of their own reflexive practices, including self-
construction by incorporating other practices into their own. These are differently 
represented by other social actors based on their positioning within the practice. Thus, 
representations enter and form social processes. Discourses involve representations of 
how things are in the present and have been during the past, but also how things might 
or should be in the future through imagining. Third, discourse figures in a way of 
taking part in the process of identity-creation (Fairclough 2003: 206).  Discourses as 
imaginaries might be established as new ways of being, new identities. The social 
formations depend upon the change of the subject. Through social practices the 
representations of self, others and different situations are positioned and reproduced 
(Fairclough 2003: 208).  
 
In the empirical part of the thesis the critical discourse analysis is used in two time 
periods. The first part of the analysis focuses on integration as a social practice before 
19 
 
the migration discourse appeared. The main aim here is to detect the aspects of the 
text that support the intergovernmental or supranational integration approaches. 
According to the hypothesis, it is expected that the pre-migration discourse includes 
more elements of supranational approach since the integration process was seen more 
positively. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the pre-migration time 
period can contain some influences or after waves of recent events and critical 
happenings in the EU such as the Eurozone crisis that might have imbalanced the 
intergovernmental and supranational attitudes towards the integration. In the context 
of the thesis, any event besides migration crisis is not separately focused on, but 
possible factors that could affect the outcome of the hypothesis are still highlighted.  
 
The second part of the analysis focuses on social practices of integration in the 
migration discourse. The aim here is similar to the first part: the elements referring 
either to intergovernmental or supranational idea of the integration are distinguished. 
According to the hypothesis there should be a change of balance between two 
approaches and intergovernmental elements such as turn to national sovereignty 
should be now more visible than supranational idea. The last part of the analysis 
compares the findings of two previous chapters and makes conclusions whether the 
set hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed.  
 
2.2 Research design 
Since the aim of this thesis is to investigate the connections between the changes of 
Visegrad understandings towards the integration, the best way to do it is by analysing 
the different annual reports and official statements1 of Visegrad countries. All of the 
used materials are published on the official webpage of the V4, accessible for 
everyone and in English. In the case of annual reports, the author of each report is 
respectively the Visegrad member state whose term of presidency it concludes. The 
authors of official statements are ministers from different policy fields as well as 
heads of the governments or presidents of the V4. Many of the meetings held include 
other countries outside of the group and in these cases the joint statements express the 
common visions of all participants. It is important to note here that every chairing 
country is free to choose a way of conducting the annual report and there is no 
                                                 
1 The official statements include joint statements, declarations, communiqués, letters and memorandums. 
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standard way of doing it. This results in publishing reports with very different amount 
of information and details.  
 
All of the reports and statements are represented jointly, this means that they express 
the common views of the representatives of four countries: Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Czech Republic. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish the views of the 
different countries and all documents are observed as subject to the V4 as a whole. 
These publicly released statements on the webpage of the Visegrad Group are suitable 
for analysis due to the fact that they include the common views, aims and interests of 
the Visegrad countries towards the European Union. These highlight how the 
Visegrad countries see their own role in the EU and also exposes the expectations 
towards the union they are part of.  
 
To make the discourse analysis as apparent and detailed as possible, also to create 
suitable conditions for comparison, the first observed time frame includes documents 
from the year 2009 until 2014. The observable period starts in the end of 2009 which 
marks the beginning of a new era in European Union: on 1st of December the Treaty 
of Lisbon entered into force. The purpose of this treaty is to make EU more 
democratic and efficient as well as to give more power to the EU institutions 
(European Union 2017b). This treaty indicates to the increased support of member 
states for more supranational union. Therefore, the first text under analyse is the 
2009/2010 Annual Report of the Visegrad Group that covers the period between July 
2009 and June 2010. All together five Annual Reports are analysed in this part: 
2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014. In addition, three 
reports out of five include selected texts of documents and joint statements adapted in 
the V4 meetings during that period. Due to a lack of suitable material, these texts are 
included in the analysis. The annual report of 2009/2010 and 2011/2012 consists of 
only the summary of activities and decisions during respective presidency while 
annual reports of 2010/2011, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 includes other documents as 
well. The annual report of 2013/2014 ends the observable period because the year of 
2015 already marks the beginning of the migration crisis in European Union.  
 
The second part of the analysis focuses on the two annual reports and official 
statements, released during the migration crisis. During the 2014/2015 presidency, the 
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peak of the migration crisis in October 2015 emerged, when around 7000 migrants per 
day crossed the sea from Turkey to Greece (European Commission). The analyse 
concludes with the annual report of 2015/2016 since the next report will be published 
not before the summer of 2017. The first analysed report includes the joint statements 
of the Visegrad Group while the other document consists of only a brief summary of 
events and decisions in 2015 and 2016. In order to slightly balance the amount of 
analysed texts between first and second period, the official statements published 
between July 2015 and June 2016 available in the homepage, are added to the 
analysis. The first analysed joint statement is released on 4th of September 2015 and 
the last on 28th of June 2016.  
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3. Analysis 
 
3. 1 Views of the Visegrad Group 2009-2014 
Between 2009 and 2014, five annual reports of the Visegrad Group were published to 
highlight the main areas of the cooperation between the members and also with the 
European union. In this chapter, these documents are analysed in order to find out 
whether more emphasis is on supranational or intergovernmental views during that 
timeframe.   
 
During the observed 5-year period, the focus of the Visegrad Group in the area of the 
European Union affairs has been relatively stable. On larger scale, the reports 
highlight the same policy areas where Visegrad express their approval of European-
level decision making and within these support the theory of European identity and 
supranational approach of integration. In the 2012/2013 report foreword, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski noted: “In the early 
years of our EU membership, key areas of Visegrad cooperation began to crystalize. 
One central theme was European policy, in particular ways of speeding up the 
economic development of our countries, i.e. the cohesion policy and the common 
agricultural policy (Polish Presidency 2013) Reports revealed that now the main 
policy areas between Visegrad and EU are economy, energy security, transport, 
climate, agriculture, cohesion, EU enlargement and neighbourhood, defence and 
security, as well as free movement of people. This quite impressive list indicates that 
European Union has moved beyond the initial boundaries and has become something 
bigger than the economic community of the region. Nevertheless, cooperation on 
these policy areas do not mean that Visegrad countries did not express their 
expectations and disagreements towards certain decisions and documents when the 
interests of the group were not taken into account. These are the areas where the 
intergovernmental approach is most favoured and felt more as a threat to the national 
sovereignty.  
 
The report from 2009/2010 highlights the field of agriculture as one of the most 
favoured policies managed in the EU level. The Visegrad group clearly states that 
problem with the dairy market, supermarket chains and future of post-2013 Common 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) “shall not be solved at member state level but at European 
level” (Hungarian presidency 2010).  Views on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
re-emerge on the 2012/2013 report regards with the reform of CAP for 2014–2020. 
Overall, the Visegrad ministers support the reforming the policy, because “the reform 
gives a possibility for changes of the CAP conducive to more effective, fair, market 
and development‐oriented policy supporting competitive position of the EU 
agriculture and its sustainability” (Polish Presidency 2013, Annex: 32). At the same 
time, they are not satisfied with some of the reform draft proposals, stating they 
require more “simplified, cost effective and non-discriminatory solutions” (Ibid). 
Moreover, in new proposed elements of the payment system they state “support to 
young farmers and small farmers scheme should be voluntary for the Member States” 
and in requirements under greening they stress “share of agricultural land devoted for 
ecological focused areas /…/ could be controlled at regional or national as well as 
farm level” (Ibid). In 2013/14 report the Visegrad Group also underlines the need for 
“larger flexibility to member states /…/ to reduce the existing differences in the 
sensitive sectors” (Hungarian Presidency 2014, Annex: 11). The two-sided approach 
to the CAP shows that the relations between Visegrad and EU are more complex than 
they may seem: from one side, the statements towards CAP supports the supranational 
approach; on the other side, it also includes intergovernmental elements. 
 
Connected with the financial decisions being part of the EU budget, the cohesion 
Policy (CP) is another example of Visegrads’ EU affairs. The 2010/2011 report, in the 
light of EU new Budget Review, the V4 (among other ministers from the region) 
highlight the cohesion policy as an important instrument in the EU budget to achieve 
the Europe 2020 objectives and “an engine for the harmonious development and 
economic and social growth of the whole European Union” (Slovak Presidency 2011, 
Annex: 53). Therefore, they support the current approaches for Cohesion Policy 
funding. In the Bratislava declaration Visegrad considers the Cohesion Policy as “one 
of the main factors helping to narrow the existing regional gaps/disparities in 
individual member states” (Slovak Presidency 2011, Annex: 27). However, similarly 
to CAP here the Visegrad also state their requirements regarding to the future EU 
Cohesion policy. Namely that the less developed regions should be able to access a 
wider range of priorities than developed ones and the “distribution of resources 
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between the priorities has to be decided by Member States according to their specific 
needs and objectives” (Slovak Presidency 2011, Annex: 53-54). Same pattern was 
repeated in the 2012/2013 yearly report, where V4 (among Slovenia) supported the 
significant progress toward Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 Regulatory Package, but still 
insist implementing their perspectives in negotiations over the next thematic blocks of 
CP (Polish Presidency 2013, Annex: 34-36). In 2013/2014 report the negotiations 
over the EU cohesion policy are closing and Visegrad is satisfied with the results by 
stating: “Exchanging experiences of bilateral negotiations with the European 
Commission, and coordinating positions so that the individual negotiating strategies 
mutually support each other and the common Visegrad objectives, were important 
factors in reaching an outcome favourable for the Central European EU Member 
States” (Hungarian Presidency 2014: 15). This shows that, although V4 favours issues 
of the cohesion Policy to be solved in the EU level, they still are very much interested 
that their concerns are taken into account. Here, the elements on supranational and 
intergovernmental are once again intertwined.  
 
EU enlargement and Neighbourhood are the policy areas that most frequently emerge 
from the analysed V4 Annual Reports regarding to European affairs. Here, the 
Visegrad holds a stable position through years, clearly stating that they are in favour 
of the further EU enlargement and the cooperation with the neighbouring countries of 
the EU is essential. Visegrad Group has held numerous meetings with the Western-
Balkan countries, also with Eastern-European states like Armenia and Georgia. These 
have showed their support to Belarus and Ukraine in times of crisis, ensuring 
strengthening ties between these countries and the EU. In the 2010/2011 report, the 
Visegrad Group highlights: “In their final statements, the V4 Ministers supported visa 
liberalisation for citizens of Western-Balkan countries, the EU and NATO 
enlargement, and settlement of some pending regional problems” (Slovak Presidency 
2011: 5). In the event of the Croatian Accession to the EU, the Visegrad countries 
stated that “Since their accession to the European Union, the V4 countries have been 
providing strong political support to the EU enlargement process by keeping this issue 
high on the EU’s agenda “(Polish Presidency 2013, Annex: 60). They also stress 
regional cooperation as European integration cornerstone and intend to continue 
developing and strengthening the European integration process (Polish Presidency 
2013, Annex: 60-61). According to the V4 statements, it can be concluded that in 
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terms of enlargement and neighbourhood, the Visegrad Group is strongly in favour of 
further European integration and, thus, support the supranational idea.  
 
Security of the region is another policy field where Visegrad group has taken a firm 
position on its views. V4 supports and stresses the necessity of EU Common Security 
and Defence Policy and, therefore, indicates to the supranational idea of integration. 
The subject of defence has been discussed by the Visegrad Group leaders through the 
analysed period between 2009 and 2014 in numerous meetings and conferences. For 
example, in the Annual Report of 2012/2013, during the GLOBSEC international 
conference the Visegrad ministers “informed the public about the adoption of a joint 
declaration, which called for strengthening Europe’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy by, among others, supporting the European defence industry “(Polish 
Presidency 2013: 16). Intentions of forming a common Visegrad Battle Group is 
another common step stated already in 2009/2010 report and formed into a firm plan 
in the upcoming reports. In the 2012/13 report they declare that creating an EU V4 
Battle Group would be their contribution to the Common Security and defence Policy 
of the European Union (Polish Presidency 2013: 28). A report published year later 
states if the Battle Group is successful, it may be used in future NATO, EU or other 
missions (Hungarian Presidency 2014: 11).  None of the analysed documents 
highlighted any V4 objections to the EU policy in this field and no elements 
supporting the intergovernmental approach were found.  
 
In terms of environment policy, Visegrad countries have also agreed to take common 
action as a union in order to achieve collective goals. In the year 2012/2013 report, 
Visegrad Group welcomes the progress EU has been made to reach the goals for 
climate policies up to 2020 and starts to form the common vision for policies beyond 
2020 (Polish Presidency 2013, Annex: 44). The V4 informs that “the Ministers 
recognise that the sharing of efforts in reaching Union’s climate and energy targets 
amongst the Member States was designed with good faith but could be improved and 
reflect changing conditions better” (Polish Presidency 2013 Annex: 47). Visegrad 
countries find that EU should have a common vision in the issues of climate change in 
the future as well and, therefore, in 2014 they state: “the proposed 2030 climate and 
energy policy framework is an appreciated step forward to low carbon economy, 
taking into account the three key elements: sustainability, competitiveness and 
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security of supply in a balanced way.” (Polish Presidency 2013 Annex: 47).  The 
Visegrad Group also supports the EU Emission Trading Scheme, establishment of 
proper carbon-leakage rules and clearly states that “a final decision on the climate and 
energy policy framework should be taken by the European Council” (Hungarian 
Presidency 2014, Annex: 61). However, in the field of environment, the V4 also have 
some ambitions to make their own decisions. This statement is supported in the latter 
report when the conclusion after the meeting of ministers declares: “discussing a 
number of topics and issuing a common declaration, they highlighted the importance 
of subsidiarity and sovereignty of countries with regard to the cultivation of 
genetically modified organisms” (Hungarian Presidency 2014: 23). Here, the 
preserving sovereignty, instead of sharing it by allowing the decision making happen 
in the EU level, supports the intergovernmental approach.  
 
Another reason, why attitudes of the Visegrad countries to the EU environment 
policies are mixed, is the fact that there is a strong connection between slowing down 
the climate change and energy security of the region. This, in turn, is related with the 
threat to regional economic growth. The V4 joint letter sent to the European 
Commission in 2012 underscored that the EU climate policy should take into account 
energy security of the Member States, while also noting the policy’s crucial 
importance for the competitiveness of the European economy (Polish Presidency 
2013: 22). The wish to guarantee the energy security is already stressed in the first 
analysed report, dating back to 2009/2010, and implementations on the field are 
continuous through all analysed years. As stated in 2012/2013 report, the need for 
ensuring energy security in European level is connected with the energy crisis in 
2009, when Russia stopped the gas supplies to Central Europe (Polish Presidency 
2013: 20). The Visegrad strongly favours the creation of common EU energy policy 
and “stresses the need for the development of the energy policy of the European 
Union implementing the objectives as agreed in the Treaty of Lisbon” (Slovak 
Presidency 2011, Annex: 43). In 2010/2011 annual report the V4 ministers expressed 
their support for “the need to further develop the regional energy sector as part of the 
EU energy market” (ibid). Next year the Visegrad countries and the European Council 
promised to cooperate closer and more comprehensively in the terms of EU Energy 
2020 strategy (Czech Presidency 2012: 11). From 2012/2013 Some conflicts 
regrading to energy security rise: “For economic benefits and against the 
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environmental considerations the Visegrad countries favour the use of fossil fuels in a 
large scale and request freedom the create their own energy mixes” (Polish Presidency 
2013, Annex: 46). While discussing the framework proposed for 2030 climate and 
energy policy, it was agreed that “there is no need for any legally binding renewable 
energy and energy efficiency target in order to ensure cost-efficiency and avoid 
competition of different policy measures” (Hungarian Presidency 2014, Annex: 33). 
In addition, V4 expects that EU fully supports the use of nuclear energy and classifies 
it as favoured low carbon technology (Hungarian Presidency 2014: 8). In conclusion, 
the V4 finds Energy issues suitable to solve on the EU level, but simultaneously do 
not agree on some solutions which brings out both supranational and 
intergovernmental elements. 
 
In the field of economic relations, Visegrad is firmly interested in strengthening the 
ties with the EU even further. Internal market and industrial policy are only a few 
examples: “concrete actions should be taken to create a single market for digital 
services; to strengthen the transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures of 
the single market; to enable the full potential of free movement of services; and to 
create the most advantageous conditions for entrepreneurs /…/ More competitive 
Europe with a strong industry and ambitious industrial policy is possible” (Polish 
Presidency 2013, Annex: 38). Through the reports Visegrad emphasises the free 
movement of goods, people, capital and services as one of the cornerstones of 
European Union. When it comes to sharing sovereignty in the EU level, economy is 
the easiest field to do it in the sake of establishing common goals and with no doubt 
also to increase the financial benefits of individual member states. 
 
The conducted analyse between the years of 2009 and 2014 highlights that the visions 
of Visegrad Group regarding the EU affairs are more complex than it may seem. At 
first, it looks that Visegrad is supporting the EU integration by all means and thus 
favouring the supranational idea of the union over the intergovernmental. However, 
the more in-depth analyse revealed that among the Visegrad–EU affairs, there are also 
statements that do not support the decision making in the supranational level. Instead, 
these are in favour of preserving national sovereignty on some policy areas and thus 
favour the intergovernmental idea. In the field of economy, security and defence as 
well as EU enlargement and neighbourhood the Visegrad Group supports the further 
28 
 
integration without any significant issues. When it comes to agriculture, cohesion 
policy, environment and energy, the stances of both supranational and 
intergovernmental can be detected. 
 
3.2 Views of the Visegrad Group 2014-2016 
This part of the analysis consists of two annual reports between 2014 and 2016 and 
are the latest, since the next report will be conducted at the beginning of July 2017. 
These reports include the beginning and evolving of migration crisis, that is a difficult 
challenge for the whole European Union. The main purpose of this part is similar to 
latter: to analyse the attitudes of Visegrad Group towards the EU affairs to highlight 
the views supporting supranational idea or on the contrary, favour the 
intergovernmental approach.  
 
Analysed annual reports of the observed period reveal that to a large extent Visegrad 
Group continues improving the already existing policy areas in terms of EU affairs. 
For 2014/2015 period, Slovak Presidency chose a motto: “Dynamic Visegrad for 
Europe and Beyond” and highlighted the interest to strengthen the competitiveness 
and economic growth as well as better coordinate the positions in European affairs 
(Slovak Presidency 2015: 4, 6).  2015/2016 report states that the focus was on clear 
and achievable priorities and instead of broadening the agenda, the focal point was on 
the already existing areas of cooperation (Czech Presidency 2016). The highlighted 
areas of EU affairs include Security and Defence, cohesion, energy, EU enlargement 
and environment. From the agricultural side, the focus has shifted to organic food 
production and the debates about completing the EU digital single market have 
intensified. However, finding common solutions for the biggest migration crisis since 
the Second Word War overshadows all the other policy areas and influences the EU-
Visegrad balance. Both reports highlight this fact as well (Czech Presidency 2016; 
Slovak Presidency 2015: 6). V4 attitudes towards certain decision among the 
European Union, especially the migration crisis, remain controversial. 
 
Discussions of future of the enlargement and EU Neighbourhood Policy, especially 
toward Western Balkans but also Eastern Partnership proved to be on the agenda in 
both analysed reports. The annual report of the Slovak presidency states: “The V4 
countries expressed their full support for the integration of Balkan countries into the 
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EU and NATO in the medium term” (Slovak Presidency 2015: 7). In the Joint 
Statement on the 25th Anniversary of Visegrad Group published in 2016, the V4 
highlights: “We have unequivocally advocated for the EU enlargement as a means of 
expanding the area of stability and prosperity. It should be considered our moral duty, 
as countries which have used the opportunities opened by our own memberships, to 
keep the doors to the EU open for future candidates” (Visegrad Group 2016a). These 
statements clearly indicate that the V4 is supporting the idea of further integration and 
thus supranational approach. 
 
Security and Defence is another area strongly and frequently represented in both of 
the reports. On EU level they mainly promise to fully committed and work towards 
more effective Common Security and Defence policy (Slovak Presidency 2015: 33-
35). As a V4 contribution to the security of Europe, they emphasise the importance of 
EU V4 Battle Group that can be a beneficial asset to use in future EU missions. 
Furthermore, they even wish to increase their contribution in a longer term stating: 
“/…/ we welcome the Polish initiative to form another V4 EU Battlegroup in the 
second semester of 2019. /…/To further enhance the V4 defence cooperation, we task 
our Ministers of Defence to /…/ work further on establishing the permanent V4 
modular force for NATO and EU rapid response formations as well as operations” 
(Slovak Presidency 2015, Annex: 34). In a joint statement issued September 4, 2015 
the Visegrad Group assures to increase their participation in the EU security by bigger 
financial, technical and expert assistance (Visegrad Group 2015a). The V4 states that 
the strengthening the area of security and defence is connected with migration crisis, 
unstable Eastern Neighbourhood and other recent happenings (Slovak Presidency 
2015, Appendix: 36). However, in the context of this analysis, it can be confirmed 
that Visegrad attitudes support the supranational idea of integration. 
 
As one of their priorities among economic affairs in 2014/2015, the Visegrad Group 
raises the important issue of Digital Agenda (Slovak Presidency 2015: 20). The V4 
sees this as a step of taking the idea of EU Single Market into a new level and making 
it fully operative and more beneficial for all member states. In 2014/2015 report, they 
highlight: “The EU Digital Single Market Strategy provides an opportunity for the 
Visegrad countries to become digital by default. “We agree to cooperate in 
negotiations on the Digital Single Market Initiatives from the very first stage” (Slovak 
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Presidency 2015, Annex: 25). The Annual report of 2015/2016 underlines again the 
progress in deepening digital agenda and this fact is supported by the many meetings 
held in the field of digitalisation processes and EU Digital Single Market (Czech 
Presidency, 2016). In a joint statement after the Britain’ decision to leave the EU, the 
Visegrad emphasise that one of the goals of the union should remain to carry out the 
still incomplete single market as one of the four basic freedoms of the EU (Visegrad 
Group, 2016b). It is clear that in terms of economic improvement and larger benefits, 
the Visegrad Group strongly favours strengthening and as well, broadening the 
economic activity within the EU borders and even finds, that EU should focus more 
on doing it. Sharing sovereignty in this case is seen as a profitable decision and refers 
to supranational idea. 
 
In the field of energy, the V4 still feels part of a very vulnerable region and thus needs 
to solve the issues in this policy area. The Annual report of 2014/2015 indicates 
increased focus on energy security and creation of common vision towards achieving 
EU energy policy objectives (Slovak Presidency 2015: 4, 12). The Visegrad Group 
sees the EU as a main contributor of finding solutions for the energy issues on the 
European level (Slovak Presidency 2015: Appendix, 23). Furthermore, to make 
energy more affordable, the V4 is willing to give EU additional legislative power by 
stating: “/…/ we highlight the importance of /…/ strengthening EU legislation related 
to security of supply and transparency of all gas agreements, while the confidentiality 
of commercially sensitive information needs to be guaranteed, as well as full 
implementation of the legislation and guaranteeing competitive and affordable energy 
prices” (Ibid). A join statement in the occasion of the Visegrad Group Summit in 
December 2015 also confirms the important role of the EU in this field: “Lastly, we 
agree that energy and energy security are one of the top priorities for the Visegrád 
region as well as for the European Union as a whole” (Visegrad Group, 2015b).  
However, the Visegrad countries firmly object all attempts of the EU to fix an 
allowed energy mix for member countries by stating: “The V4+ countries also 
maintain their position that any decision on climate and energy policy must respect 
that it is the sovereign right of every Member State to freely choose its most suitable 
energy mix as provided in the Treaty” (Slovak Presidency 2015: Appendix, 62). From 
the last report, it can be concluded, that in terms of energy cooperation, even the V4 
can have different views: “However, on some issues the V4 were unable to find a 
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common position, which only confirms the trend towards fragmentation of V4 energy 
cooperation” (Polish Presidency, 2016). The attitudes towards EU energy policy areas 
tend to be mixed. Overall, the Visegrad is supporting finding solutions to energy 
issues on the European level and even agrees that EU should have more legislative 
power over the area which clearly indicates supranational vision. However, 
simultaneously they strongly insist keeping the right to choose their own energy mix 
by emphasising on the sovereignty and thus support the intergovernmental approach 
of European integration.  
 
In the area of cohesion policy, the Visegrad group continued to shape their common 
positions on EU Cohesion Policy programs for the 2014-2020 programming period. 
The main discussion took place in 2015 May, when Visegrad among with Slovenia 
and Croatia agreed to accept the idea of improving EU Cohesion Policy under an 
ambitious Investment Plan for Europe. The V4 states: “We UNDERLINE that the 
new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) will complement and be 
additional to the EU Cohesion Policy programmes which remain the most important 
drivers of investment in our countries and which considerably facilitate private 
investments” (Slovak Presidency 2015: Appendix, 58). The V4 also highlights the 
importance of financial instruments, to meet the objectives of Cohesion Policy, which 
go further than 2014–2020 programming period and agree that “bringing the best 
value for money should be the top priority in implementation of Cohesion Policy” 
(Slovak Presidency 2015: Appendix, 59). The year 2015/2016 report states that 
although Cohesion Policy was supposed to be one of their thematic priorities as well, 
it was set aside: “/…/ the review of the Cohesion Policy envelopes for 2017–2020 did 
not take place due to the absence of a Commission proposal” (Czech Presidency, 
2016). Nevertheless, several other meetings regarding to Cohesion Policy were still 
held. In one of the meetings, the V4 agreed to support addressing the migration 
challenges by allocation financial sources from the EU budget, but without affecting 
for example, the cohesion policy (Visegrad Group, 2015b). Since Visegrad Group 
highlight the importance of Cohesion Policy to the member states and there are no 
direct objections in any V4 statements in regarding to the Cohesion policy during the 
analysed term, it can be concluded that here the supranational idea of integration 
dominates. 
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In environmental field, Climate change, Clean Air Package and Waste Package were 
the main topics under discussion in the European level (Slovak Presidency 2015: 17). 
In the framework for EU’s Climate and Energy policy the V4 supported clean air 
package to further reduce air pollution as well as Circular Economy and Waste 
Package proposal while agreeing that “prevention of waste generation is one of the 
key elements from the side of the resource efficiency approach” (Slovak Presidency 
2015, Annex: 63-64). The V4 also agrees that the EU should have a common position 
in the 2015 Paris Climate conference (Slovak Presidency 2015, Annex: 63). In 
addition to agreements, the Visegrad Group voices their dissatisfaction towards the 
conditions in the environmental field as well. They highlight that the level of 
pollutants reduction in the Clean Air Package is too ambitious, the Waste Package 
should consider with different base line of EU members and the recycling targets are 
overly ambitious as well. Furthermore, they emphasize: “The introduction of any 
legally binding renewable energy and energy efficiency targets at EU or national level 
is not desirable” (Slovak Presidency 2015, Annex: 62-64). The complex attitudes 
prove that Visegrad approves environment and climate policy as something to deal 
with EU level supranationally. Accordingly, in some directives they do not want to 
agree with legally binding decision and thus support intergovernmentalism. 
 
With no doubt it can be implied that the migration crisis was the biggest issue in the 
agenda for the both analysed reports and caused many heated debates. For the Slovak 
Presidency, the migration problem arose in the second part of the chairing, while for 
the Czech Presidency, the crisis overshadowed all other policy areas (Slovak 
Presidency 2015: 6; Czech Presidency, 2016). Although in the European agenda since 
the Lisbon Treaty, the migration now rapidly became the EU level issue. To a large 
extent, V4 shows their solidarity in the issue: they express regret over the lost lives in 
the Mediterranean Sea; they are willing to contribute financially and through sending 
humanitarian aid to the zone of crisis and intensify the protection control over the 
external borders of the EU; they agree that it is crucial to find effective solutions on 
the root causes of migration. In a 2015 joint statement the V4 highlights: “. In the 
spirit of shared European values of humanism, solidarity and responsibility, the 
countries of the Visegrad Group have continuously taken an active part in defining 
and implementing many measures in response to the migration challenges” (Visegrad 
Group, 2015a). Furthermore, the V4 welcomes the European Agenda on Migration as 
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an attempt to a comprehensive framework to find solutions (Slovak Presidency 2015: 
28). However, accepting the mandatory migration quotas to ensure the more balanced 
relocation of the refugees is the EU approach the V4 have been fully objecting since it 
was introduced (Slovak Presidency 2015: 6). In addition, the Visegrad Group 
expresses their disappointment towards the EU for not finding “adequate solutions to 
migration pressure from and via the Western Balkan route as well as the Eastern 
route” (Slovak Presidency 2015: 26). The 2015/2016 Annual Report indicates, that 
the V4 demands toward voluntary solidarity measures came under criticism and 
therefore the “V4 brand” lost some of their good reputation (Czech Presidency, 2016).  
However, even in the terms of migration policy it would not be possible to see the 
Visegrad attitudes as a fully intergovernmental approach because of objecting the 
mandatory migration quotas. In other fields, the group is giving their contribution to 
tackle the root issues and find long term solutions to the migration crisis.  
 
The analysed period between 2014 and 2016 has proven to be very turbulent in terms 
of Visegrad and EU relations, but still full of cooperation. At the beginning it might 
seem, that the crisis changed the V4 attitudes toward the EU integration to a large 
extent, but the conducted analyse proved no radical changes. Again, different policy 
areas proved to contain supranational as well as intergovermental ideas of the 
integration. In the field of EU enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Digital Single 
Market, Security and Defence, as well as Cohesion Policy, the statements of the V4 
supported further European Integration and thus indicate to supranational idea. The 
mixed approaches to different issues could be seen in the policy areas of environment, 
energy and migration where elements of both–intergovernmental and supranational–
were visible. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Comparison of the two periods and results 
The period between 2009 and 2016 has been very productive time for the Visegrad 
Group in the terms of strengthening their position among the European Union. The 
V4 has developed their cooperation between each member state and capability to 
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shape common views towards the EU policies. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
compare the two analysed periods, in order to highlight the similarities and 
differences in the statements of Visegrad Group on the EU level.  
 
One of the policy areas, where Visegrad Group have a consistent vision between the 
2009–2014 and 2014–2016 is the EU enlargement and Neighbourhood. The Visegrad 
group is a strong supporter of the EU enlargement and find it essential to strengthen 
the ties between the neighbouring countries of the V4 as well as European Union to 
ensure the stability and prosperity of the region. Here, the Visegrad Group statements 
support the supranational view in both analysed periods and the emerging migration 
crisis do not have any impact on their common views. 
 
Another area where Visegrad wants European Union to join forces and work together 
for a common goal is the security and defence. V4 strongly emphasise their 
contribution to the EU Common Security and Defence policy by creating the EU V4 
Battle Group and support the European defence industry. The reports of 2014/2015 
and 2015/2016 revealed the V4 intention to create another Battle Group by 2019 and 
establish the permanent V4 modular force for NATO and EU rapid response 
formations and operations. The views supporting common efforts to ensure the 
security of European region did not change after the beginning of migration crisis. On 
the contrary, it can be implied that it terms of critical issues that could threaten the 
safety of 28 member states like the migration crisis makes the V4 aspire even stronger 
and more integrated EU Common Security and defence Policy. There is no change in 
attitudes toward this field between the two periods and hence it leans toward 
supranational idea of European integration. 
 
The economic field combines many different policy directions the Visegrad Group 
supports with the aim to ensure the further increase of benefits for the member states. 
In the firs analysed period, the V4 concentrates on implementations of the internal 
market and industrial policy, more precisely on the ambition to create the single 
market for digital services, to strengthen different infrastructures, provide prosperous 
conditions for entrepreneurs and develop free movement in all areas. In the second 
analysed period, the V4 focuses more on deepening the digital agenda and supports 
the EU Digital Single Market Strategy and overall emphasises on establishing the still 
35 
 
incomplete single market as one of the cornerstones of the EU. In conclusion, it can 
be implied that economic affairs between the EU and Visegrad countries aspire for 
further EU integration, regardless of the migration crisis. Thus, here the supranational 
idea is supported. 
 
The next area of EU–Visegrad affairs is the EU Cohesion Policy which provides the 
member states the financial instrument through different projects to promote their 
further development. This is also one of the reasons, why Cohesion Policy is an 
important asset for V4. During the first analysed period, the V4 supported the current 
for the cohesion funding and highlighted the policy as one of the main elements to 
decrease the gaps between and within member states. However, the negotiations on 
the future objectives of the EU Cohesion Policy expressed the V4 requirements. They 
demanded the accession of more priorities for less developed regions and the right to 
decide on the member state level how the resources between priorities will be 
distributed. The next analysed period stressed less attention to the policy area due to 
migration crisis but overall the Visegrad group agrees with the new EU directions in 
the field in terms of European plan for investment and emphasises the importance to 
meet the objectives of Cohesion Policy beyond the 2020 vision. Between the 2009 
and 2014, the mix of intergovernmental and supranational ideas is visible in the 
attitudes of Visegrad Group toward the EU policies. The years 2014–2016 included 
only V4 statements of supporting the EU on the cohesion policy areas and 
supranational elements. In the discourse of migration crisis, the attitudes toward EU 
indeed changed to a certain extent but not from supporting the integration to prefer 
sovereignty. The slight shift was from mixed elements of both ideas to more 
supranational approach. 
 
As one of the most overwhelming issues of 21st century, the V4 and EU have built a 
solid base for achieving the common goals in terms of environment and climate 
change. During the first period under examination the V4 overall supports achieving 
goals for EU climate policies for 2020 and beyond. They support the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme, having a common vision of the whole EU in climate change and 
clearly highlight that the final decision of climate framework should be taken on the 
EU level. On the other hand, the Visegrad countries do not support the EUs’ 
supranational position in terms of Genetically Modified Organisms and wish to keep 
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their sovereignty of decision making it this field. During the next period, the pattern 
continues: Overall they support the effort of the European union to solve 
environmental issues by agreeing the necessity of Clean Air Package, Waste Package 
and Circular Economy and emphasized taking a common EU position for the Paris 
Climate conference. The V4 is dissatisfied with overly ambitious targets for climate 
change, not counting with the different member states situations and do not agree with 
establishing any legally binding renewable energy or energy efficiency targets. In the 
field of environment, the attitudes of the V4 continuously include elements of 
supranational and intergovernmental approach through both periods and the migration 
crisis do not have any influence in this policy area. 
 
During the first period, the V4 askes EU to take into account the energy security of 
the member states in the process of shaping EU Climate Policy. Ensuring the energy 
security is one of the longest ambitions of the Visegrad Group during the analysed 
years, dating back to the first report. The V4 approves the need for common EU 
energy policy and affirms contributing towards EU Energy 2020 strategy. However, 
V4 stances on the energy field are not entirely pro-European. By indicating it as the 
threat to economy the Visegrad Group strongly favours the extensive use of fossil 
fuels and demand freedom for member states to create suitable energy mixes. The 
second period outlined the increased focus of the energy security. In order to make 
energy more affordable, the V4 is even willing to give more legislative power to the 
EU in this area while stating that energy and energy security are top priority areas for 
the Visegrád Group and also to European Union. Nevertheless, they still strongly 
continue to object the idea of fixed energy mix and emphasise the sovereignty of a 
country to choose it freely. Similar to the environment policy area, the declarations 
toward the EU energy politics are continuously controversial and thus both periods 
contain elements of supranational as well as intergovernmental integration 
approaches. The migration crisis has not changed the V4 attitudes so far. 
 
Visegrad Group also finds it necessary to cooperate with the European Union in the 
areas of agriculture. Moreover, during the first analysed period, they declare that 
Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 should be solved at the European level. They 
also support the policy reforming for the 2014-2020 period. Despite generally 
agreeing to let the EU tackle the agricultural issues, the V4 still do not agree with the 
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EU’s supranational power in some cases. In supporting young farmers and small 
farmers scheme the Visegrad Group highlights the need to decide on member state 
level and give more flexibility to the individual actors in sensitive sectors. The second 
period of analyse is less focused on agriculture but the remaining activity express a 
shift towards the organic food production and debates on the issue will continue in the 
future. Since the V4 have not specified their positions toward the agricultural policy 
in the second analysis, the final conclusions on the change of attitudes cannot be done. 
 
The most complicated policy area for EU and V4 to find a common stance proved to 
be migration crisis. Between 2009 and 2014, the migration issues covered only a very 
small amount of the Visegrad agenda and the areas into discussion were including 
mainly the regional cooperation among V4 members, especially on dealing with the 
illegal immigration from Western Balkans (Czech Presidency 2012: 11). Although the 
Common Asylum policy in the EU level had already been established by 2009, there 
is not much evidence on dealing with the area during the first period. In the 
2010/2011 Annual Reports also briefly mention V4 cooperation on migration in a 
larger scale referring to subsequent migration waves from North Africa and the 
migration of Roma minority group (Slovak Presidency 2011: 16). The issue of the 
mass migration arrived into the EU agenda during the second analysed period and 
since then all the member states including V4 have participated in numerous debates 
in order to find common solutions. The Visegrad Group has taken a very controversial 
stance on the issues of migration. On the one side V4 highlights their preparedness to 
contribute finding solutions and relieve the migration crisis. Furthermore, they 
welcome the endeavours of the EU to effectively deal with the crisis. In spite of their 
remarkable contribution to finding solutions, the V4 is categorically disagreeing with 
the EU on establishing the mandatory migration quotas and sees this as a threat to the 
state sovereignty. In terms of migration policy, it can be summarized that the crisis 
did change the V4 attitudes toward the migration–it became part of the EU affairs. 
Since the Visegrad Group supports finding solutions to the issue in the EU level but 
do not agree with some EU approach, the supranational as well as intergovernmental 
idea of European Integration is represented. 
 
In the policy areas of economy, security and defence as well as EU enlargement and 
neighbourhood, the attitudes of the Visegrad Group support the supranational idea of 
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integration and the migration crisis do not change the attitudes among these areas, 
these have remained supranational. In the areas of cohesion, agriculture the stances of 
the V4 have slightly shifted from being a mix of supranational and intergovernmental 
elements to support more the supranational idea. In the areas of environment and 
energy, the attitudes also consist approaches of both integration ideas and continue to 
do it even after the beginning of migration crisis (Table 1). 
 
Conducted analysis proved that with the emergence of migration crisis the balance 
between EU and V4 changes. The issues emerging from the first part of the analysis 
do not witness any drastic change of attitudes throughout the whole analysed 
timeframe while the migration crisis does. The reason behind it is the fact that other 
policies cannot be seen as critical issues while the migration problem is an important 
crisis that can negatively influence the whole European Union. The fact that asylum 
policy was partially supranationalised with the Treaty of Lisbon, but was not under 
discussion during the first period, emphasises even more, that the issue has to be 
critical in order to change the attitudes of the member states to take a turn towards 
intergovernmentalism. Thus, it can be declared that the conduced hypothesis is 
proven. The outcome of this thesis also proves, that in times of crisis the constitutive 
norms can dominate over the regulatory norms meaning that states will make their 
decisions based on their interests. Furthermore, the emergence of critical issues 
emphasises that the identities are socially constructed and can change with the 
context. The findings of the thesis confirm that perhaps the European Identity 
coexisting with the national one is not enough for the social perspective of European 
integration after all.  
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Before the crisis After the start of the crisis 
 Economy, security and 
defence, EU 
enlargement and 
neighbourhood 
 
 Migration 
 
 Cohesion and 
agriculture 
 
 Environment and energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 Economy, security and 
defence, EU 
enlargement and 
neighbourhood 
 
 Cohesion and 
agriculture 
 
 
 
 Environment and 
energy 
 
 Migration 
          
Table 1. The positions of different policy areas before and after the start of the 
crisis based on analysis. 
  
   Supranat. 
  Intergov. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to analyse the change of positions and statements of the 
Visegrad countries toward the European integration, based on the challenges and 
critical questions that EU is facing.  The hypothesis of this thesis implied that in terms 
of migration crisis the Visegrad Group favour national sovereignty over the European 
integration. 
 
To support the thesis, the critical discourse analysis was conducted based on social 
constructivist views, which emphasises the importance of the soft powers, for 
example ideas and identity. To form in-depth analysis, the competing ideas of 
supranational governance and intergovernmentalism were used. The analysed 
documents were the annual reports and official statements (2009-2016) of the 
Visegrad Group. The analysis consisted of three parts. First part focused on the 
attitudes of the V4 on main EU policies before the migration crisis and the second part 
analysed the views of Visegrad Group within the refugee crisis. The third part 
compared the outcomes of the previous parts.  
 
As a result, the hypothesis formed in the beginning was confirmed. The analysed 
documents highlighted that in critical times the Visegrad Group countries support 
intergovernmentalist approach within the group and wish to preserve their national 
sovereignty when it comes to making decisions in alliance with the EU.  
 
Conducted analysis proved that with the emergence of migration crisis the balance 
between EU and V4 changes. The logic behind that is the fact that migration crisis is a 
nationally critical issue and therefore the Visegrad countries prefer to maintain their 
sovereignty and do not support making critical decision in the EU level. The issues 
among politics in the first part do not highlight a bigger change of attitudes 
throughout the whole analysed timeframe while the migration crisis does. Other 
policies, however, are not seen as a threat to national sovereignty. Thus, it can be 
declared that the conduced hypothesis is proven.  
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Resümee 
 
Integratsiooni raamistamine kui suveräänsuse akt Visegradi riikide näitel 
 
Viimasel kümnendil on Euroopa Liit pidanud hakkama saama mitmete tõsiste 
kriisidega. Majanduskriis, Kreeka võlakriis, migratsiooni- ja pagulaskriis ning 
hiljutine BREXIT on vaid mõned näited hiljutistest ärevatest sündmustest. Lisaks on 
üha enam näha natsionalismi tõusu mitmes Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigis, nagu 
Prantsusmaa, Saksamaa, Ungari ja Poola. Need faktorid on mõjutanud ka 
liikmesriikide ja EL-i vahelist integratsiooniprotsessi. Avalikus sfääris levib mitmeid 
väiteid, et tekkinud kriisid on seotud natsionalismi tõusuga. Kriitilistel aegadel, mis 
nõuavad vankumatuid otsuseid ja tugevaid juhte, ei toeta kõik liikmesriigid tingimata 
EL-i rahvusülest (supranational) lähenemist ja jagatud suveräänsuse ideed. Veelgi 
enam, kriitilistes olukordades tunduvad rahulolematud liikmesriigid eelistavat 
rahvuslikku suveräänsust integratsioonile. See võib põhjustada vastuolusid, mis viivad 
vastaspoolte vaheliste pingete ja vaidluste tekkimiseni ning ohustavad sellega kogu 
Euroopa ühtsust, kaasa arvatud integratsiooni tulevikus ja rahu regioonis. Sellise 
riikide grupi valisin põhjusel, et Visegradi grupp on näidanud üles palju 
rahulolematust Euroopa Liidu hiljutiste otsuste üle. Stabiilsust ohustavad veel lisaks 
sealsed hiljutised poliitilised arengud, eelkõige paremäärmusliku poliitilise eliidi 
tugevnemine Visegradi riikides.  
 
Käesolev bakalaureuse töö käsitleb Visegradi Grupi, kuhu kuuluvad Poola, Tšehhi 
Vabariik, Ungari ja Slovakkia, suhtumise ja hoiakute muutumist, kui Euroopa Liit 
seisab silmitsi kriitiliste sündmustega ja väljakutsetega. Piiritlemise mõttes 
keskendusin töös ühele olulisemale  – pagulaskriisile.  
 
Töö alguses püstitatud hüpotees  on järgmine:  
Kui Euroopa Liit on vastamisi tundlike ja tõsiste väljakutsetega, siis Visegradi 
Grupi riigid eelistavad rahvuslikku suveräänsust integratsioonipoliitikale.  
 
Analüüsitavateks allikateks on Visegradi Grupi aastaaruannetes leiduvad väited 
ajavahemikus 2009-2016. Nende lahtimõtestamiseks on kasutatud kriitilist 
42 
 
diskursuseanalüüsi ja teoreetiliseks lähtekohaks on konstruktivism. Lisaks sellele oli 
keskseteks lähenemisteks kaks omavahel võistlevat ideed: rahvusülene valitsetus 
(supranational goverance) ja valitsustevaheline lähenemine (intergovermentalism). 
Materjali analüüsimise meetodiks osutus valituks diskursuseanalüüs. Teoreetilisi 
lähtekohti kasutades selgus aastaaruannete põhjal püsitatud hüpotees kinnitust.  
 
Migratsioonikriisi ilmnemine muutis tasakaalu Euroopa Liidu ja Visegradi Grupi 
vahel ning tõi välja Visegradi vastuseisu lubada rahvusülest otsustamist 
migratsioonipoliitikas. Samas, teiste poliitikavaldkondade puhul ei muutnud Visegradi 
Grupp oluliselt oma seisukohti üleminekul ühelt võrreldavalt perioodilt teisele. See 
näitab, et kriitilistes olukordades nagu pagulaskriis, ei poolda Visegradi riigid 
suveräänsuse jagamist ja Euroopa Liidu rahvusülest võimu teha otsuseid. 
 
Antud töö analüüs oli jagatud kolmeks erinevaks, kuid omavahel põimuvaks, osaks. 
Esimene osa hõlmas aastaid 2009-2014 ja teine osa 2014-2016. Kolmas osa on 
võrdlev sümbioos kahest eelnevast osast.  
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